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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Federalist, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison wrote to persuade 
their readers to support ratification of the proposed Constitution.2 In their eighty-five newspaper 
essays, they attempted to explain the wisdom of every provision of the Constitution and defend 
the document against every criticism. In the first of these papers, Hamilton, sets out their 
purpose:
I propose in a series of papers to discuss the following interesting 
particulars–The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity–The inefficiency 
of the present Confederation to preserve that Union–The necessity of a 
government at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the attainment of 
this object–The conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of 
1
 Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. This Article is part of a larger 
project on the Framers’ reliance on the experiences of contemporary and historical civilizations. I 
am indebted to Darcy Williams for his assistance.
2
.  See Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew, 100-25 (arguing that The Federalists’s 
authors were writing “not a theoretical treatise on political philosophy but a practical 
commentary on the uses and misuses of power . . . .” At 125). Richard B. Bernstein, Are We To 
Be a Nation?, 230-42 (Harvard U. Press 1987) (recounting the history of The Federalist).
republican government–Its analogy to your own state constitution–and lastly, The 
additional security, which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that 
species of government, to liberty and to prosperity.3
In making the argument, Publius, the collective pen name of the three coauthors, draws 
lessons from experiences of other countries, including the classical civilizations. For example, a 
glance at an index to The Federalist would disclose 14 references to Rome and 11 to Greece.4
Newspaper readers of that day apparently would easily understand these references.5 However, 
the modern reader would find most of them quite obscure. Except for classicists, few modern 
readers, for example, would know about the dictatorship of the Roman decemvirs or the popular 
assemblies of republican Roman, such as the comitia centuriata and comitia tributa.
Since the time of the Constitution’s framing and ratification, our intellectual canon has 
changed. In that earlier era, for example,  readers would have understood why the authors of The 
Federalist would have chosen the pseudonym of Publius. The pen name was a reference to 
Publius Valerius, known to the Roman people as “Publicola” (lover of the people) who helped 
found the Roman republic after the overthrow of the Tarquinian line of kings.6 Today, few 
readers would appreciate the reference. Ancient history is no longer central to American. 
education and culture.7
3
. The Federalist No.1, at 6 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U. Press 1961) (emphasis in 
original). There is some disagreement over the numbering system and the authorship of some of 
the papers. This Article follows the numbering system and the attributions of authorship used in 
this edition. For a discussion of these controversies, see id. at xiv-xxx.
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. See id. at 664 & 699 (listing these references in the index to the book).
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. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 231.
7
. On the centrality of classical history in the era of the Founding, see Forrest McDonald, 
Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 5 (U. Press of Kansas 1985).
[M]ost of the Framers were versed in the history of Greece and Rome, of confederations 
and republics, and of England at least since Elizabethan times. Moreover, most of them 
thought historically and used references to history to support or illustrate their reasoning. 
During the first three weeks of the [Constitutional] convention, for instance, delegates 
buttressed their arguments with historical examples at least twenty-three times, not 
counting references drawn from British or colonial or recent American history, inclusion 
of which would treble that total. John Dickinson, Pierce Butler, Benjamin Franklin, 
George Mason, James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, and Charles 
Pinckney delivered to their colleagues mini lectures and lectures that sometimes lasted 
for hours on the lessons to be drawn from ancient or modern history.
The shift in the American canon may impede our understanding of the Framers and their 
work. A lack of information may result in more than failing to grasp an analogy buried in an 
essay. To understand a historical analogy fully, the reader needs historical context. Otherwise, 
the reader may discern the essence of the analogy, but fail to appreciate its full meaning. For 
example, in reading Federalist No. 70, the reader might puzzle over this sentence: “The 
Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their 
usurpation than any ONE of them would have been.”8 By reflecting on the surrounding sentences, 
the reader might determine that Hamilton is arguing in favor of having a single executive, rather 
than several executives sharing power, because he believes that a multiple executive is more 
likely to be enticed into tyranny than a single executive. If the reader knows nothing of Roman 
history, he or she may surmise that the decemvirs were a group of leaders similar to a multiple 
executive. However, if the reader enjoyed a deeper understanding of history, he or she would 
know that in the fifth century, B.C.E., the patricians capitulated to the plebeians’ demand for a
codified law that would rein in the discretion of the patricians in administering law.9 The 
patricians appointed ten men, the decemvirs, to draft the laws and to have complete power over 
the state for one year. However, after one year, the decemvirs succeeded in gaining another year 
in which to complete the project. After the second year, the decemvirs still did not relinquish 
their power. Eventually a scandal forced them out. A reader who has the knowledge or, better 
yet, knows an even more complete version of this story could fully understand Hamilton’s 
argument: Even officials appointed to assume civic responsibility for an important task can be 
tempted into becoming tyrants.
As another example, a modern reader of Federalist No. 41 would encounter this
statement: “No less true is it that the liberties of Rome proved final victim to her military 
triumphs . . . .”10 From these words, the reader might discern that Madison fears the interference 
of the military in civic affairs. The surrounding sentences might disclose that the particular issue 
is whether the proposed Constitution was prudent in authorizing a standing army.11 As a 
proponent of the Constitution, Madison has to argue that despite the dangers of a standing army, 
it is necessary for self defense and that the Constitution provides a check on military power by 
providing that Congress can appropriate revenues to support the army for a term of no longer 
than two years.12 However, only with knowledge of Roman history can the reader understand 
why Madison’s contemporaries would view a standing army with great trepidation: Rome’s 
Id. at 5. An index to James Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1782 notes 
16 explicit references to Rome and 5 to Greece. At 673 & 666 (W.W. Norton 1987).
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standing army became such a powerful force that it installed and murdered emperors with some 
regularity.13
This Article seeks to assist today’s reader in gaining the historical context necessary for 
an informed understanding of The Federalist’s references to ancient Rome. The Article explains 
each significant reference to Rome with a somewhat simplified, but nonetheless richly textured 
historical background for the reference.
The Article begins with a brief outline of the history of republican Rome, the era to 
which Publius makes most of his Roman references. The outline gives the reader enough history 
to follow the discussion that follows. The Article then organizes the Roman references under 
four arguments that Publius makes: the need for a national government, the need for a single 
executive, the best way to structure a government, and the need for a standing army. The Article 
concludes with brief reflections on the extent to which these classical references were persuasive 
to Publius’ readers, what the references tell us about how the Framers viewed Roman history, 
and, in light of our fading familiarity with classical Rome, on what political references do 
modern commentators rely
II. THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: A HISTORICAL OUTLINE
As might be expected, the history of Rome’s early years depends more on legend than on 
verifiable fact.14 Rome’s story begins on the Latium plain along the Tiber river. In ancient times,  
the city of Alba Longa boasted a line of kings that extended back to Anaeas, the Trojan hero. In 
the eighth century, B.C.E., Amulius usurped the throne of his elder brother Numitor. However, 
Rhea Silva, Numitor’s daughter, then had twins, fathered by Mars. The twins, Romulus and 
Remus were placed on a raft, which eventually landed on shore. The twins were then raised by a 
she-wolf. When they came of age, they killed Amulius, restored Numitor to the throne, and set 
out to found their own city.
In 753, Romulus quarreled with his brother and killed him. He then proceeded to build 
the city of Rome. After Romulus’ death in 717, the city was ruled by a series of kings, ending 
with the line of Tarquinian kings. The line ended when Lucius Tarquinius (Surperbus) turned the 
kingship into an absolute monarchy and consequently was deposed by the patricians, led by 
Lucius Junius Brutus.
With the end of the Tarquinian line in 509, the republican era began, and its political 
structure gradually took shape. In addition to the patrician senate, all Romans belonged to 
13
. For an extensive discussion of these events, see supra § V.
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. In this Article, the accounts of Rome rely on standard, uncontroversial history. Thus, to 
document every statement with a citation would be unnecessary and a bit comical. Standard 
histories include Arthur E.R. Boak, A History of Rome to 565 A.D. (Macmillan Co. 1935); 
Raymond Bloch, The Origins of Rome (Frederick A.Praeger Publ. 1969); Marcel Le Glay et al., 
A History of Rome (Blackwell Publ. 1997); Livy, The Rise of Rome: Books 1-5 (T.J. Luce trans. 
Oxford U. Press 1998) Charles Merivale, A General History of Rome (Harper & Bros. 1879); 
Chester G. Starr, The Ancient Romans (Oxford U. Press 1971); J. Wells, A Short History of 
Rome (Barnes & Noble 1963).  
another assembly, the patrician-dominated comitia centuriata; however, the senators effectively 
exercised a veto power over its decisions. Among its other functions, this assembly appointed 
two consuls to head the state and the army. Each consul could veto the proposals of the other. 
Not until 367 could a plebeian hold this office.
After several class conflicts between the patricians and plebeians, the plebeians gained 
permission to elect tribunes who would represent them before the senate and consuls and who 
would have the power to veto any law that the consuls proposed.
The plebeians also demanded the security of a written code of laws, and, in 451, ten men, 
the decemviri were chosen to write the code. While completing the project, they would enjoy 
absolute political power. The decemviri codified Roman customary law on twelve tablets. 
However, when they finished their work, they refused to relinquish their political power until 
they were forced to resign. Still, during the life of the republic, conflicts between patricians and 
plebeians continued with the patricians generally continuing their domination.
During the ensuing centuries, Rome conquered Italy and many foreign lands. Perhaps the 
most notable military events were the three Punic Wars against Carthage, the African city and 
Mediterranean trading empire (264-241, 218-202, 149-146). At the end of the third war, the 
Romans demolished Carthage and ploughed salt into the ground to prevent it from rising again.
Intertwined with the Second Punic War was Rome’s struggle with the Hellenistic 
Empires. Philip V of Macedon had allied himself with Carthage. Afterward, he refused to agree 
to stop seizing Greek territories, and, in 196, the Romans quickly defeated him. Meanwhile, 
Antiochus III of the Seleneid Empire continued his aggressions against the Greek cities until, in 
189, he also met defeat at the hands of the Romans. However, Philip’s successor, Perseus then 
became active in Greece, only to meet the same feat as Antiochus. 
Particularly after the second Punic War and the Macedonian wars, the divide between 
rich and poor increased dramatically. The growing conflict came to a head in 133 when Tiberius 
Gracchus became a tribune and proposed massive land reform. His efforts led to political conflict 
and ultimately to a riot in which a group of senators clubbed him to death. In 124, his brother 
Gaius was elected tribune and also attempted to implement reforms. Although he met with some 
success, the resulting conflicts ended in bloodshed and Gaius’ death .
The ensuing years brought a war in Africa, an attempted invasion by German tribes, and 
civil war in Italy. Marius and Sulla, two popular generals, became political rivals and, with their 
military forces backing them, took turns controlling Rome and slaughtering those who opposed 
them. Rome was left with a corrupt government.
The republic was to end with the rise of Julius Caesar. In the early years of his political 
career, Caesar joined forces with Pompey, another military hero, and Crassus, also a military 
leader and an extremely wealthy man. While Caesar was away from Rome, conquering the Gauls 
and Germans, Pompey remained in the city consolidating political power. Meanwhile, Crassus 
was killed while fighting the Parthians in Spain.
Pompey and Caesar were now rivals. When Caesar returned from Gaul, Pompey had 
withdrawn to mobilize his troops. After compelling the senate to declare him dictator, Caesar 
pursued and defeated Pompey. When Caesar eventually returned, he restored order and, in 44, 
became dictator for life. Yet, within five months, he was assassinated by senators who hoped for 
a return to the republic and patrician power.
By 29, Caesar Augustus (formerly named Octavian), the grandson of Caesar’s sister and 
Caesar’s adopted son, had conquered all rivals. Although he retained the republican 
governmental institutions, at least nominally, he had initiated the era of the Roman Empire.
III. THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
In arguing against continuing a loose confederation of states and establishing a vital 
national government, Jay, Hamilton, and Madison looked to Roman history for examples of the 
dangers of a confederacy. They argued that (1) confederation members inevitably end up in 
conflict; (2) these conflicts can result in anarchy; and (3) confederations increase the risk of 
individual members forging foreign alliances that could lead to foreign domination
A. The Inevitability of Internal Disputes: Rome’s Conflicts With Its Neighbors
To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent 
unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to 
disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the 
accumulated experience of the ages.
.     .     .
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a 
tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those flammable 
humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, 
will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each 
other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of 
mutual amity and concord.
.     .     .
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all Republics; two of them, 
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in 
wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. 
Sparta was little better than a well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of 
carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial Republic, was the aggressor in the very 
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of 
Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in 
the territories of Carthage and made a conquest of the Commonwealth.
.     .     .
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries, which would seduce us into an expectation of
separation?  Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 615
Here, Alexander Hamilton argues for a unified government, and expresses his skepticism 
about the pacific instincts of the current confederation of states. According to Hamilton, a nation 
(or state) is inevitably  drawn into conflict with its neighbors. Moreover, even though states are 
not ruled by monarchs, their current governmental structures will not lessen the chances of 
hostility among them. As history shows, even republics are prone to falling into conflict with 
their neighbors. A united American republic, on the other hand, will encourage peace among the 
states far better than would the present confederation.
Ancient Rome could chronicle a long history of conflict with its neighbors.16 Shortly after 
the destruction of the monarchy in 509 B.C.E., Rome concentrated not only on creating the new 
republic, but also on conquering its Italian neighbors. In fact, during the first one hundred years 
of the republic, almost every summer witnessed a Roman military campaign against its Italian 
neighbors. For instance, in 396, Rome laid siege to the Etruscan city of Veii. This struggle 
between the Romans and Etruscans was constant in Rome’s first centuries. By 275, the Romans 
exercised control over the entire Italian peninsula, with its northern border at the Po Valley. 
Moreover, this Roman expansion was achieved more by its military resources than its diplomatic 
efforts.  
Yet Rome itself did not remain unscathed in the early years of the republic. For years, 
Gallic barbarians were moving out of their homelands in central Europe and into areas like 
France, Spain and Britain. When they reached the Po Valley, they began to raid Italian lands, 
traveling as far as central Italy. Rome sent out an army to quell this threat; however, the force 
faced annihilation at the Allia river. The Gauls continued their march south and, in 392, sieged 
and sacked Rome. The city itself was almost completely destroyed, and the Gauls left only after 
being pushed out by Camillus, a Roman patrician who was elected emergency dictator by the 
curiate assembly.    
This near disaster, however, failed to deter Roman bellicosity. Instead, warfare became a 
part of Roman culture, and it was rare for a year to go by without Rome engaging in a war.  The 
doors of the temple of Janus, erected by Numa Pompilius, were to be closed whenever Rome was 
at peace. However, those doors were closed for only two short periods during the republican era: 
in 24, after the consulship of Manlius following the First Punic War, and, in 29, under the reign 
of Caesar Augustus at the end of the republican era.
As Rome’s domination over Italy became unassailable, Rome began to look abroad for 
new foes. During the age of the republic, Rome would engage in  military campaigns against 
virtually every civilization bordering on the Mediterranean Sea. By 54, Roman military ambition 
had reached as far north as Southern Britain. 
15
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Among the most famous of Rome’s many military campaigns were its wars against its 
neighbor Carthage in North Africa, in present-day Tunisia. Over the course of one hundred and 
twenty years, Rome and Carthage would engage in three costly wars known as the Punic Wars.  
The First Punic War was sparked in 264, when the Mamertines, a group of Italian mercenaries, 
invaded the island of Sicily. The Sicilian authorities requested aid from both Carthage and Rome. 
Carthage agreed to come to the rescue of the Sicilians; however, the Romans felt that their 
loyalties rested with the Mamertines and supported them. Inevitably, Rome came to blows with 
the Carthaginians, and, in 241, Roman naval forces decisively defeated Carthaginian forces at the 
Aegates Islands.     
By 226, Carthage had attempted to expand its empire by establishing a strong foothold in 
Spain. In that year, Rome imposed a limitation on Carthaginian eastward expansion in Spain by 
setting the boundary of Carthage’s expansion at the Ebro River. Hannibal, the Carthaginian 
general in Spain, was angered by this Roman imposition. In 219, he attacked the city of 
Saguntum,  which was an ally of Rome.  Despite pleas from Saguntum, Rome did not come to its 
aid, and after an eight-month siege, the city fell to the Carthaginians. After the fall of Saguntum, 
Rome sent ambassadors to Spain demanding the surrender of Hannibal. However, Carthage 
would not acquiesce to this demand, and, in 218, the Second Punic War officially commenced.  
The early stages of the war went very badly for Rome, as Hannibal brought his army and 
elephants through the Alps and into Italy in their famous march. However, in 216, the war would 
reach its most devastating point for Rome when Hannibal annihilated the Roman army at Cannae 
in Eastern Italy. In the course of the battle, 25,000 Romans would be killed, and 10,000 would be 
captured, including one Roman consul, Terentius Varro. The other Roman consul, Aemilius 
Paullus, was among the dead at Cannae.  Thus, in the course of this one battle, Rome lost both its 
high magistrates and the army on which it depended to defend the Italian peninsula.  However, 
Carthaginian fortunes soon turned around however, as the young Roman general Scipio 
Africanus, launched a campaign on Carthage itself and, in 202, defeated Hannibal at Zama. This 
Roman victory forced Carthage to once again surrender to Rome and pay the reparations of 
10,000 gold talents as well as surrender all their war elephants and disassemble their navy.
The Roman-Carthaginian hostilities, however, did not end in 202. Many Romans 
maintained  that insuring a lasting peace required the destruction of Carthage. The most notable 
advocate of this position was Cato the Elder, who after every speech before the Senate 
proclaimed, “Carthage must be destroyed.” This view gained popular acceptance in Rome, and 
the Romans began to seek armed conflict with Carthage and its African neighbors. In 149, the 
two republics commenced their third war, and, after the city of Carthage fell, Roman forces  
razed the city to the ground and salted the earth to make the land uninhabitable.  
Rome’s conflicts were not limited to conquest or self-defense; through bouts of civil war, 
the republic also suffered carnage. The Roman Social War (91-88) and the conflicts that 
followed serve as excellent examples of the Roman penchant for civil war. The Social War was a 
result of years of non-Roman Italians being dissatisfied with their statue as quasi-citizens of 
Rome. The various inhabitants of Italy were granted some of the benefits of Roman citizenship, 
but not complete citizenship with full benefits. In 91, Livius Drusus, a Roman demagogue, 
suggested that all Italians should receive Roman citizenship. As a result, he was assassinated, 
and his proposal was rejected by the Senate.  These events sparked a revolt amongst the Italian 
tribes of the Samnites and the Marsi, and Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Marius set out with Roman 
legions to pacify the rebels.  
Although these two generals were able to quell the insurrection, they nevertheless would 
do more harm than good for the republic through their competition with one another. In 88, Sulla 
was elected consul and received the command of a Roman army to fight Mithradates in Asia. 
While Sulla was away on campaign, Marius seized control of Rome and had some of Sulla’s 
allies killed. Marius then died, leaving his supporters in power. In 83, Sulla returned from the 
east and set about placing Rome back under his rule. Sulla took his army and marched on Rome, 
where, in a vicious battle outside the Colline Gate of Rome, Sulla defeated the forces of Marius’ 
followers and regained control of the city. Sulla then proclaimed himself dictator of Rome and 
compiled a list of names of those who were disloyal to him during his absence. These lists, 
known as proscriptions, awarded monetary sums to those who presented Sulla with the heads of 
those who had been proscribed. In 78, Sulla died, and the republic briefly returned, to the 
governmental form it possessed prior to 88.
Very shortly afterward, Gaius Julius Caesar, a young general and politician, would once 
again plunge Rome into civil war.  After a political falling out with his one time friend and co-
ruler, Pompey the Great (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus), Pompey secured a decree of martial law 
and had himself declared sole-consul.  Meanwhile, Caesar was stationed in Gaul in charge of an 
army and aware that he would be subject to prosecution in Rome for the illegal passage of 
legislation when he was consul in 59. In order to avoid this fate, Caesar instead mobilized his 
army and led them across the Rubicon River, which separated Cisalpine Gaul from Italy. With 
this move, Caesar had declared war on the government by bringing his armed soldiers out of 
Gaul and into Italy without permission. Caesar quickly destroyed the opposition he met in Italy 
and forced Pompey to flee to Greece. In 48, at Pharsalus in Thessaly, Caesar defeated Pompey’s 
forces in battle and caused Pompey to flee to Egypt. Pompey was subsequently assassinated by 
agents of King Ptolemy XIII of Egypt, an ally of Caesar’s.  
The civil war, however, did not end with the death of Pompey and the appointment of 
Caesar as dictator. Caesar then began chasing the children of Pompey and their armies across the 
Mediterranean basin. In 46, Caesar took his army to North Africa, where some of Pompey’s 
followers remained and defeated them on the battlefield at Thapsus. The survivors fled to Spain 
where Caesar won a decisive victory against the Pompeians at the battle of Munda, effectively 
ending the civil war and allowing Caesar to return to Rome and rule until his assassination in 44.
         In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton warns that neighboring states tend to enter into 
conflict. He suggests that in order to avoid such disaster in the new nation, the states should not 
continue as a confederacy, but should form a union, effectively subjecting all the States to one 
government and decreasing the chances of war among them. As Hamilton argues, such conflicts 
were common with Rome and its neighbors. Nonetheless, Hamilton ignores the Roman
republic’s propensity to fall into civil wars as well as external wars. This problem of civil war 
would come to divide the United States less than a century later.
B. The Threat of Anarchy Among Confederation Members: The Macedonian War 
Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter 
confederation, and persevered in her Union, she would never have worn the 
chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
.     .     .
Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked by his tyrannies, 
fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achaeans, though weakened by 
internal dissensions and by the revolt of Messene one of its members, being 
joined by the Etolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding 
themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more 
had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing to the succour of foreign 
arms. The Romans to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip 
was conquered; Macedon subdued.  A new crisis ensued to the league.  
Dissentions broke out among its members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates 
and other popular leaders, became mercenary instruments for inveigling their 
countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder, the Romans 
had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already 
proclaimed universal liberty throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, 
they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the 
violation it committed on their sovereignty.  By these arts this Union, the last 
hope of Greece, the last hope of antient liberty, was torn to pieces; and such 
imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty 
in completing the ruin which their arms had commenced. The Achaeans were cut 
to pieces; and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important
portion of history, both because it teaches more than one lesson and because, as a 
supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates 
the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among members than to tyranny 
in the head.
James Madison, Federalist No. 1817
In this paper, Madison recounts events occurring in Greece in the third and second 
centuries B.C.E.18 His purpose is  to demonstrate that confederations of states more commonly 
slip into anarchy than fall under the rule of a tyrannical government. Madison uses the Achaean 
example in order to show his readers the dangers of a loose confederation of states and argue that 
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. For discussion of these events, see Boak, supra note 13, at 99-115; Jean Hatzfeld, 
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Merivale, supra note 13, at 185-202; Claude Orrieux & Pauline Schmidt Pantel, A History of 
Ancient Greece 359-61, 365-67 (Blackwell Publ. 1999); Starr, supra note 13, at 37-38; F.W. 
Walbank, Aratos of Sicyon 26-28 (Cambridge U. Press 1933).
the most secure form is a unified government under a constitution.
In 281, a group of four city-states banded together to revive the long since dissolved 
Achaean League. The number of cities within this confederation of states grew over the years 
until its membership included Dyme, Patrae, Tritraea, Pherae, Aegion, Bura, Ceryrea, Argos, 
Megalopolis, Corinth, Pellene, Olenos and Sparta. The religious center of the Achaean League 
rested at the temple of Zeus Amarios in Aegion. Here the assembly of the League gathered four 
times each year to hold meetings (Synodoi). At the head of this assembly were the eleven 
members of the executive board (Synarchiae), who were the true rulers of the confederation. 
Because this small group of men held almost exclusive power, the Achaean League can best be 
described as an oligopoly.           
Before the end of the Second Punic War in 201, Rome had little fear of the Greek city-
states or leagues. However, Hannibal’s near-conquest of Rome after his crushing defeat of the 
Romans at Cannae in 216, opened the Senate’s eyes to the need to defend Rome from the threat 
of outside invasion. As a result, Rome began to adopt a strategy of defensive imperialism, which 
called for Roman control over any regions that could potentially pose a threat to Rome.  
After Attalus I, the king of Pergamum, and a delegation from the trading center of 
Rhodes warned Rome of a secret pact between Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III of Syria 
and asked for Rome’s assistance, Rome began to take a considerable interest in Greek affairs. 
The Roman Senate saw a possible threat to Roman soil if this alliance were allowed to gain 
power. Thus, in 200, Rome followed  its newly emerging strategy of defensive imperialism and 
turned its attention to Philip.
Rome first gave Philip an ultimatum to restrain himself from attacking Greek or Egyptian 
cities or else face war. Philip refused, and the Second Macedonian War officially commenced.  
At the same time, Rome sent envoys to Antiochus assuring him that it did not intend to begin any 
aggression against him in Syria. This statement was designed to  prevent Antiochus from having 
any reason to join forces with Philip in Macedon.  
With Antiochus out of the way, Rome was free to engage Philip and ultimately defeat 
him in 197 in Thessaly at the battle of Cynoscephalae. Philip then fled to Macedon and sought 
peace with Rome. Strangely, in the wake of the Greek campaign, Rome did not occupy or annex 
any Greek land.  
Rome had other plans for Greece. In 196, T. Quinctius Flamininus, the Roman consul and 
Roman general at Cynoscephalae, proclaimed that regions once under Macedonia’s domination 
were now independent; he thus freed the  Corinthians, Phocidians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiot 
Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians and Perrhaebians. Naturally, this decree caused excitement 
among the liberated Greeks.
The Romans had an ulterior motive in giving the Greeks their independence. The Greeks 
would not be free at all. Instead, Rome intended Greece to be a client state of Rome and serve 
three functions: (1) become a post for Roman surveillance of the East, (2) serve as a buffer state, 
and (3) act as a main road for any future Roman operations in the east.  
During this period, anarchy began to emerge among the confederated city-states in the 
Achaean League. Many of the cities had been forced to join the League against their will and 
strived to regain independent status. Their efforts, in turn, led to internal strife within the League, 
and Rome was called in to pacify the situation. 
The Achaean League also was facing internal division with respect to whether the League 
wanted Rome’s intervention in its affairs. The controlling powers in the Confederacy supported 
Roman policies, while their rivals argued that the League should be able to operate 
independently of any intervention of Rome. Naturally, Rome agreed with the controlling powers, 
and, as a result, the dissenters sought an alliance with Macedon.  
Macedon was by no means neutralized as a result of Philip’s defeat in the Second 
Macedonian War. When Philip died in 179, his son Perseus inherited an army of 40,000 men.  
Perseus, like his father, harbored a disdain for Rome, and soon after he assumed power he began 
making contacts with those in Greece who shared his anti-Roman sentiments. Rome, however, 
was kept aware of this growing Macedonian threat through its espionage efforts and with the 
help of King Eumenes II of Pergamum. In 197, Eumenes II had succeeded Attalus I as king of 
Pergamum. In 171, Rome forced Macedon into the Third Macedonian War. In 168, Perseus met 
defeat at Pydna, and the war officially ended the following year.
Rome now set out to punish certain Greek factions such as the Rhodians, Epireans and 
Achaeans for their perfidy in supporting Macedon. After seizing territory from Rhodes and 
devastating Epirus, Rome turned its attention to Achaea. Rome deported to Italy 1000 Achaean 
men who were reported to have been part of the anti-Roman faction. Among them was the 
famous historian Polybius. The Romans learned about these men from Callicrates, a traitor to 
their cause. For seventeen years, these men were held as hostages, thus assuring Greek 
compliance with Roman policies. 
The Achaean League would later fall under the rule of a factional government that was 
completely dependent on Rome for the maintenance of its power. However, this government 
would end in the aftermath of the conflict between the Achaean cities of Sparta and Corinth. In 
146, an insignificant territorial dispute resulted in Corinth attacking Sparta. Following the attack, 
a delegation from Sparta traveled to Rome to ask for Roman intervention in this conflict within 
the Achaean League. As a result, a Roman delegation went to Achaea and demanded that the 
Achaean League release control of Sparta, Corinth, Argos and some other members of the 
League. At this point, the League’s leadership consisted of nothing more than unsupported 
demagogues. They refused to comply with the demand and encouraged an open revolt in order to 
attain independence from Roman policy. However, this ragtag group was no match for the 
disciplined Roman legions, and the rebellion quickly faltered. In 146, Rome exacted revenge by 
the sacking of the City of Corinth and selling its inhabitants into slavery. Rome declared that 
Achaia was to no longer enjoy independence, but would become a Roman province with Roman 
rulers.  
In Federalist 18, Madison warns that anarchy is a common occurrence in confederations. 
As he makes clear with the example of the Achaean League, if the United States were to remain 
a simple confederation, it could meet with disaster. Instead, Madison argues that a unified 
government acting under a constitution would be the most stable governmental structure for the 
new nation.
C. The Risk of Foreign Influence: Roman Alliances
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies, 
will find abundant reason to apprehend, that those in contemplation would in no 
other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither 
love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, 
jealousy and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the 
situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., formidable only to 
each other.  
.     .     .
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring 
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, 
would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from 
Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger 
from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should 
be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than 
to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us 
not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets in our ports, and 
foreign armies in our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. 
How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, 
and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the 
governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
John Jay, Federalist No. 519
In this paper, John Jay rejects the proposal that the states should divide into three or four regional 
confederacies that enter into alliances with one another. According to Jay, the natural differences 
in the northern and southern economies and uneven strengths of the states could lead to 
jealousies between the confederacies. Conflicts among these confederacies could lead an 
individual confederacy to increase its might by forging alliances with foreign nations. Jay then 
argues that a foreign ally can manipulate an alliance to conquer a confederacy. As one example, 
he notes that ancient Rome would act as a friend to a confederacy and slowly take it over.
In Federalist No. 18, James Madison illustrates Jay’s point with his account of the Macedonian 
Wars and the fall of the Achaean confederacy of Greek city-states.20 Rome initially served as a 
protector and defender of the Achaean League, ostensibly to keep it stable and independent. 
However, Rome had its own self interest at heart and, in 146, declared the region to be a Roman 
province under Roman rule.  
In Federalist No. 5, John Jay warns his readers that establishing several interrelated  
confederations of states would open the door to internal controversies and perhaps even foreign 
usurpation.  This foreign usurpation, Jay suggests, could happen in a way similar to the way that 
Rome gained dominance over allies like the Achaean League. A foreign nation could join with a 
confederacy under the guise of friendship, but then, slowly make changes to the confederacy and 
finally gain power over its former ally.
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IV. THE NEED FOR A SINGLE EXECUTIVE
At the Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph of Virginia proposed a three member 
executive and declared that the single executive would be “the foetus of monarchy.”21 In 
elaborating on his opposition, Randolph offered four arguments:
1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of 
Monarchy. 2. That a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to 
all the objects of the department. 3. That the necessary confidence would never be 
reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. That the appointments would generally be in 
favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the 
remote parts would not be on an equal footing.22
In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton points to classical Rome to argue that having 
multiple executives can lead to destructive rivalries among the officials and even increase the 
risk of tyranny. To illustrate, he employs the examples of the consuls and military tribunes and 
the decemvirs.
A. A Multiple Executive Risks Destructive Rivalries: Consuls and Military Tribunes
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks; It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the 
protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty 
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. Every 
man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was 
obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable 
title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired 
to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose 
conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of 
external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
.     .     .
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.  Decision, activity, 
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a 
much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number; and in 
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.  
This unity may be destroyed in two ways;  either by vesting the power in 
two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly 
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in one man, subject in whole or in part to the controul and cooperation of others, 
in the capacity of counselors to him. Of the first, the two consuls of Rome may 
serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of 
several of the states. New York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only 
states, which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. Both 
these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the 
votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if 
not to equal, to similar objections; and may in most lights be examined in 
conjunction.
The experience of other nations will afford little instruction in this head.  
As far however as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be inamoured of 
plurality in the executive. . . . The Roman history records many instances of 
mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the consuls, and between 
the military tribunes, who were at times substituted for the consuls. But it gives us 
no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state,from the 
circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between 
them were not more frequent, or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment; until we 
advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed 
and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the states, and 
pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. 
The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the 
preservation of their antient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were 
generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal 
interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this 
motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the 
bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide 
the administration between themselves by lot;one of them remaining at Rome to 
govern the city and its environs; the other taking command in the more distant 
provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing 
those collisions and rivalships, which might otherwise have embroiled the peace 
of the republic.  
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 7023
Here, Alexander Hamilton stresses the importance of having an energetic executive and 
further argues that the ideal executive should consist of a single officer. Hamilton supports his 
position, in part, by looking to lessons from classical Rome.24 For Hamilton, this history 
demonstrates that having multiple executives leads to destructive disunity. However, for the most 
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part, the historical record demonstrates that having multiple executives was not problematic to 
the stability of the republic. Yet, during the nearly five centuries of the republic, conflicts 
between consuls caused serious problems.
In 509 B.C.E., with the fall of the monarchy, Rome instituted a new republican 
government that included two chief magistrates, known as consuls. Originally, the consulship 
was filled only by men of patrician ancestry, that is,  descendants of the original senatorial 
families of the previous regal regime. However, as Hamilton failed to note, in 367, one of the 
two consular positions was opened to the Roman plebeian class. 
The Roman consuls were annually elected by the patrician-dominated comitia centuriata,  
After completing one year of service, an ex-consul could seek election again only after a ten-year 
interval. In the republic, the consuls held imperium, meaning that they would possess both 
military and civil power. However, any legislation proposed by the consul was subject to the 
approval of another assembly,  the Tribunes of the Plebeians, who could veto any proposals. 
Further, the consuls would listen to advice given to them by the Senate. Any judicial decree of a 
consul was subject to appeal to the people if the decree ordered capital punishment. Further, any 
action taken by one consul was subject to the veto of the co-consul.  This dual executive thus had 
an internal check, that prevented any one consul from becoming a tyrant. When a  military 
campaign began, one or even both consuls commonly left Rome and commanded the army. Of 
course, this tradition carried a risk, because one or both consuls could die in battle, leaving Rome 
without one or both executives.  
As one might expect, the two consuls sometimes did not agree on an issue. Although the 
mutual agreement of the consuls served as a critical check on consular power, disagreement 
between the consuls occasionally did not prevent one consul from pursuing his desired course. 
For example, in 59, both Gaius Julius Caesar and Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus were co-consuls; 
however, the conservative Bibulus often opposed Caesar’s proposals. As a result, Gnaeus 
Pompeius (Pompey the Great), Marcus Licinius Crassus and Caesar, the members of the political 
alliance known as the Triumvirate, employed their loyal military veterans to harass Bibulus 
whenever he left his house. Accordingly, Bibulus confined himself to his home, allowing Caesar 
to run the state without opposition from his co-consul, illegally passing any proposals he wished.     
When Rome faced a particularly menacing threat, the government occasionally would 
resort to a single ruler, known as a dictator, who would be charged with quelling the threat. The 
dictatorship usually was to last no longer than six months or no longer than needed to complete 
the dictator’s primary task. A dictator was appointed by the two consuls with the consent of the 
Senate. Unlike a consul, however, a dictator did not exercise control over military matters. 
Instead, the dictator would appoint a master of the cavalry, to look after military affairs. With 
respect to political decision making, a dictator enjoyed greater power than a consul; the tribune 
of the Plebeians had no veto power against the acts of a dictator.
Although historical records are unclear, the first dictator is believed to have been 
appointed around the year 500.  The Romans frequently resorted to dictators in the fifth century, 
but less often in the fourth century. For instance, when the Vosci, a neighboring tribe, invaded 
Roman territory in 407, Publius Cornelius was appointed to eliminate the threat.  In the third 
century, the use of dictators had all but died out except for during brief periods during the Punic 
Wars. The dictatorship fell into disuse as Roman affairs became more stable at home. However, 
in the first century, the dictatorship would be revived.
Following years of civil war, in 82, former consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla defeated 
military forces that had supported the deceased Roman general Marius. That very same year, 
with the ambitious opposition eliminated and with the support of his army, Sulla had himself 
appointed dictator. However, Sulla created a new type of dictatorship.  Employing military 
threats, Sulla pressured the Senate into appointing him dictator for life. He ruled absolutely until 
he voluntarily retired in 79.
Like Sulla, Gaius Julius Caesar was able to gain the dictatorship and hold it longer than 
the traditional six-month period. In 49, after Caesar illegally crossed the Rubicon River and 
entered Italy with his army, Rome was once again thrown into civil war. This civil war matched 
the forces of Caesar against those of his former friend, Pompey the Great who had recently 
become sole consul. In 48, Caesar defeated Pompey in battle at Pharsalus in Thessaly.  
Following this victory, and the subsequent assassination of Pompey in Egypt, Caesar was free to 
rule Italy unopposed.  In 46, Caesar made himself dictator for ten years and, in 44, made himself 
dictator for life.
In Federalist No. 10, Hamilton neglects to mention that dictators such as Caesar and 
Sulla were not simply checking the ambitious behavior of fellow Roman demagogues, but were 
pursuing their own ambitious goal of seizing power. Thus, the people of Rome did not seek 
refuge behind these dictators. Rather, the dictators forced themselves upon Rome. 
Another powerful magistracy in Rome was the military tribune. In frenzied times, when 
conflict was taking place on multiple fronts, two consuls could not to meet the demands of the 
situation. In these periods, the patrician-dominated assembly, called the comitia centuriata, 
would elect from the military chiefs a board of men, military tribunes, who would hold. By 366, 
however, Rome had ceased to use these military tribunes.
When military tribunes failed to back each other, the results could be disastrous. In 402, 
for example, Rome was at war with several tribes from neighboring territories. In a coordinated 
attack, the Veii, Capanetes and the Falisci all attacked a Roman fortification under the command 
of the military tribune Manius Sergius. The situation was desperate for Sergius, and his only 
hope was support from the main army group, which was camped to his rear. The main army 
group, however, was commanded by a fellow military tribune named Lucius Verginius.  
Unfortunately for Sergius’ soldiers, Verginius and Sergius shared a mutual enmity for one 
another. As a result, Verginius would do nothing until Sergius asked him for his help. Further, 
Sergius, was too proud to ask his political enemy for assistance. Sergius’ troops suffered massive 
losses, and the survivors were forced to flee the fort and return to Rome in defeat.
In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton argues that in order to achieve maximum 
efficiency in the American executive, no more than one person should serve as the chief 
executive officer. Hamilton points to the executive rivalries that occurred in Rome in instances 
such as the conflict between Sergius and Verginius. However, Rome’s difficulties require some 
perspective. The republic survived for almost five-hundred years. Practically every year saw the 
election of a new college of chief magistrates in one form or another, be it military tribune or 
consul. Yet, the instances of internal consular or tribunal dissent were relatively rare.
B.  A Multiple Executive Increases the Risk of Tyranny: The Decemvirs
When power therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to 
admit of their interests and views being easily combined into a common 
enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more 
dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who from 
the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and 
more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as 
when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes 
their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them 
could have been.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 7025
In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton argues the risk of tyranny is greater with a multiple 
executive than with a single executive officer. In order to prove his point, Hamilton directs his 
readers to the decemvirs, a group of rulers who despotically dominated Rome in the mid-fifth 
century B.C.E.26
The Roman republic witnessed a continuing power struggle between the patricians, the 
wealthy ruling class who enjoyed complete control, and the plebeians, the commoners who 
comprised the majority of the city of Rome. One of the major sources of tension between the two 
social classes in ancient Rome was the judicial system, which employed a system of common 
law. As common law, the laws were not codified, and the patrician magistrates exercised 
complete discretion in judicial matters.  
In 462, Gaius Terentilius Harsa, a Tribune of the Plebeians, challenged this discretionary 
authority.  Harsa insisted that the laws of Rome be codified. With codification, the magistrates
would know what the law was and presumably would apply it even-handedly to both patricians 
and plebeians. Initially, this proposal did not garner support from the patricians. However, after a 
group of commoners stormed and seized the Capitol, they submitted to the plebian demand. 
The patricians first sent a group of commissioners to Greece to observe the methods used 
to codify laws in the East. After this research was complete, Rome interrupted its normal 
magistracy elections and instead appointed the college of decemvirs, ten men to rule the state, 
and to draft the laws over the period of one year. Each of the ten men had ultimate power over 
the state, and rotated their command on a daily basis. Further, each man was assigned twelve 
lictors, the traditional guards and agents of the Roman consuls who carried fasces, long axes 
bundled with rods, which were the traditional symbol of royalty in ancient Rome.  
In March, 451, the first college of the decemvirs assumed power and set to work drafting 
the law as well as administering to the needs of the state. At the end of their year in power, the 
decemvirs had completed ten tables of laws, written on large flat sheets of wood. However, the 
task of codifying the laws was incomplete, and so a second college of decemvirs was authorized 
to finish the task over the next year.
In May, 450, the second college of decemvirs began its work under the leadership of 
Appius Claudius, a patrician who served with the first college of decemvirs.  During its time in 
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power, the second decemvirate would complete a further two tables of laws, making a total of 
twelve tables of laws. However, during this second college, the decemvirs began to exercise a  
tyrannical hold of Rome. In 450, the decemvirs entered the Forum, each surrounded by his 
twelve lictors. Previously, only the one decemvir who was in charge of the state for the day 
would be surrounded by his lictors. Naturally, this display served as an overwhelming 
demonstration of power and served to intimidate those who would normally stand up to their 
actions.
The decemvirs then allowed the patricians to take advantage of the plebeians without any 
legal recourse. Young patricians would crowd around the decemvirs as escorts, stealing whatever 
property they wished from the plebeians and generally mistreating them. The patricians also 
resorted to violence against the plebeians, scourging some and beheading others.  
In May 449, the decemvirs were supposed to relinquish their power. However, they 
called no elections, and no one was appointed in their places. As a result, the people feared that 
these men comprised a  new and unstoppable dictatorship. Meanwhile, the Sabines and the 
Aequi, both tribes from the areas surrounding Rome, attacked Roman territory, and the Roman 
Army was ordered to engage them. However, even when a crisis faced the state from an external 
source, the decemvirs would not stop their tyrannical ways. While out on campaign against the 
Sabines, one Roman, Lucius Siccius, held secret meetings with his comrades in which they 
discussed the possibility of renaming plebeian Tribunes and caused the Roman plebeians to 
refuse to military service and secede by migrating to the Aventine Hill. News of these meetings 
found its way to the decemvirs, who then promptly arranged for Siccius’ assassination.   
However, the greatest outrage of the decemvirs, and ultimately the source of their 
downfall, was the attempted enslavement of a plebeian girl named Verginia.  Decemvir Appius 
Claudius had become infatuated with Verginia despite her betrothal to a plebeian. In a scheme to 
have his way with the girl, Appius created the false charge that Verginia was actually a daughter 
of a slave, and, moreover that she was born at one of his agent’s estate.  If true, Verginia would 
have been the property of Appius’ agent, who would naturally give Appius access to her. 
Verginia’s father, Verginius, went to the Forum and appealed to Appius Claudius to drop his 
false accusation. When Appius refused to listen to his pleas, Verginius grabbed a butcher’s knife 
and thrust it into Verginia.  
Vergenius’ defiance of the decemvirs was well received by the plebeians. Verginius then 
rushed to the legions, which were still on campaign, and successfully urged them to come to 
Rome and occupy the Aventine Hill as a demonstration of revolt. Powerless, the decemvirs were 
forced to relinquish their positions. Shortly thereafter, a new government was elected which was 
identical to the government preceding the two colleges of decemvirs.  Justice was restored; the 
twelve tables of law would be equally administered to plebeian and patrician alike.  Appius 
Claudius and another decemvir committed suicide after being taken into custody by the new 
Roman government.  The other eight decemvirs would flee Rome forever, and, in 449, the state 
seized their property.
In Federalist Paper No. 70, Hamilton warns of the dangers of having multiple executives 
ruling a country.  By using the example of the decemvirs, Hamilton argues a that a body of 
multiple official with common interests can become oppressive. Hamilton asserts that a better 
system is the single Executive who will be less prone to act on any tyrannical impulses than 
would be a group of men.
V. STRUCTURING GOVERNMENT
In constructing a new governmental system, the Framers had to face such questions as 
how the new national government would interact with the existing state governments and what 
sorts of internal checks would prevent tyranny. Although Madison believed that he was moving 
beyond the political science of the past, he still sought to learn from history.27  In classical Rome, 
he found assistance in the stories of Rome’s early leaders, in its assemblies with overlapping 
jurisdictions, in the senate as an internal governmental check, and in the employment of tribunes 
as a popular check on the patrician senate. 
A. Creating a Constitution by Assembly: Rome’s Early Lawgivers
It is not a little remarkable that in every case reported by antient history, in 
which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of 
framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed 
by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity. . . . The 
foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by Romulus; and the 
work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. 
On the abolition of Royalty the Consular administration was substituted by 
Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such reform, which he alledged 
had been prepared by Servius Tullius, and to which his address obtained the 
assent and ratification of the Senate and the people. History informs us likewise of 
the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend; as well as of 
the expedients which they were obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms 
into effect.
James Madison, Federalist No. 3828
In Federalist No. 38, James Madison notes a succession of Roman heroes who enjoy the 
reputation of single-handedly making drastic improvements in the City of Rome.29 In doing so, 
he notes that a prevalent theme among the ancient civilizations was that of the lone-ruler single-
handedly building the state. These individual heroes stand in contrast to the large number of 
delegates from several states who together shaped America’s Constitution. Madison only subtly 
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suggests that a better way to construct a government is to employ a delegation of thoughtful 
individuals of good will.  
The first Roman lawgiver to whom Madison refers is  Romulus. According to one legend,  
Aeneas, the Trojan hero, was blown off course by the Juno and landed in Italy. Aeneas married a 
member of the powerful Laurentes royal clan and ruled over their territory until he drowned in 
the brook Numicius. His son, Ascanius, then founded the city of Alba Longa, where Aeneas’ 
descendants remained as leaders. However, after 300 years had passed, Numitor and Amulius, 
both brothers and members of Aeneas’ royal lineage, became rivals, and the evil Amulius ousted 
Numitor from the throne. Amulius then learned that his niece, Rhea Silva, had given birth to 
twins who were fathered by the God Mars.  
Upon realizing that the twins, Romulus and Remus, stood to inherit the throne of Alba 
Amulius ordered them thrown in the Tiber River. With Romulus and Remus out of the way, 
Amulius was then secure in his rule. However, the two infants did not perish, but instead floated 
downstream and landed on the riverbank. There, they were rescued and fed by a she-wolf.  
Following their rescue, Romulus and Remus were discovered by Faustulus, a shepherd, who took 
in the two boys and raised them. When they were old enough, Romulus and Remus returned to 
Alba and exacted revenge on their great uncle by killing him. Leaving their grandfather to run 
Alba, they then set out on their own to found a new city.
When the twins arrived at the site where the shepherd had raised them, Remus saw six 
vultures, which he took as a sign that he would rule the new city. However, Romulus later saw  
vultures as well, but double in number. Romulus interpreted the greater number to mean that he 
was to rule the new city. Each brother was proclaimed king by his respective followers, and 
Romulus and Remus each selected one of the nearby seven hills on which to start his kingdom. 
However, according to one legend, Romulus would later kill his brother Remus after Remus 
tauntingly jumped over the wall of Romulus’ fledgling fortifications. After the murder of Remus, 
Romulus remarked, “so shall perish all who attempt to pass over our walls,” and, after 753 B.C., 
he was ruler of  the city.  
This city on the Tiber River would later be named Rome to honor its founder, Romulus. 
While king, Romulus took many steps to ensure the stability of the city. To build up the 
population, he declared the areas of the Palatine and Capitoline Hills to be places of refuge, 
which attracted diverse settlers from the surrounding regions. In order to maintain the 
population, he needed an influx of women to mate with his predominantly male subject. As a 
solution, Romulus arranged to have a festival honoring the God Consus with a neighboring tribe 
called the Sabines. After the Sabines were too intoxicated to resist, the men of Rome grabbed the 
Sabine women and carried them back to the fortified city of Rome. This incident became known 
as the rape of the Sabines.
Naturally, conflict opened up between the Romans and the Sabines, but, when Rome was 
on the verge of defeat, Romulus prayed to the God Jupiter and promised to construct a temple in 
his honor if he would deliver the Romans from peril. Jupiter answered the prayer and the 
Romans were able to turn the tide of the battle. It was at this point that the Sabine women, who 
had been captured by the Romans, intervened on the battlefield and were able to make a peace 
between the men. After this, Romulus and the Sabine king, Titus Tatius, would co-rule Rome in 
harmony. Thus, Romulus’ plan to ensure the growth of the Roman population was a success. 
Rome now had an influx of much needed women, and Rome achieved peace with the 
neighboring Sabine tribe.
Romulus ruled over Rome for a total of thirty-seven years. During his long rule, Romulus 
is credited with creating Rome’s governmental structures. To assist in ruling the state, he chose 
one hundred people and assigned them positions in the senate. These early Senators were known 
as patres. Their descendants would also achieve positions of power in Rome as the hereditary 
ruling class known as the patricii (patricians). Further, he permitted the commoners to create an 
assembly and gave it a code of law. In 716, Romulus mysteriously disappeared, leaving the city 
of Rome without a ruler.
Following a year without a king, Numa Pompilius assumed control of Rome. Of Sabine 
descent and of a highly religious nature, he established Rome’s religious foundation.  Because he 
saw how destructive military life was to morality, he endorsed a peaceful way of life. To this end 
he commissioned the construction of the Temple of Janus. The doors on this temple were to be 
closed whenever Rome was at peace. The doors remained closed for Pompilius’ entire reign. 
However, as an indicator of Roman military policy and the rareness of peace, the gates of Janus 
were shut for only two short periods afterwards, once after Manlius’ consulship at the end of the 
First Punic war in 241and once again during the reign of Caesar Augustus in 29.
In his creation of Rome’s religion, Pompilius set up a religious hierarchy of priests. He 
established priest positions (flamines) to honor Jupiter, Mars and Quirinus., and the pontifex 
maximus, the position of high priest. Through the efforts of Pompilius, the Alban cult of Vesta 
was transferred to Rome. Pompilius also developed the Roman calendar.
After Pompilius’ death in 673, the Senate ratified the choice of Tullus Hostilius as the 
new king. Hostilius, a warlike leader, stood in stark contrast to Pompilius and his peaceful ways.  
Hostilius would bring power to Rome by subjecting the tribes surrounding the city to war and 
defeat. However, Hostilius also was committed to construction projects, such as his construction 
of the Curia Hostilia, built as the Senate House at the base of the Capitoline Hill.  
In 641, following the disappearance of Tullus Hostilius, Ancus Marcius reigned over 
Rome. With Marcius’ death came an end the line of kings from the Sabine tribe. In their place, 
the Senate elected the first in a line of three kings of Etruscan origin, Tarquinius Priscus. In 578, 
the sons of Ancus Marcius assassinated Tarquinius Priscus. In the wake of the murder, Priscus’ 
wife, Tanaquil installed their adopted son, Servius Tullius as the king of Rome.  
Servius Tullius enjoys the reputation as one of the most important statesmen in Roman 
history. During his rule, he took considerable measures to improve the infrastructure of Rome.  
Among his most important accomplishments was the division of the classes in Rome. Tullius 
established five classes, each divided into centuries, and created the comitia centuriata, which 
made various political decisions.
Tullius also extended the physical borders of Rome by expanding the city to the Viminal 
and Quirinal Hills. He then constructed a wall that surrounded all seven hills of Rome. He thus 
marked the boundary of Rome as it would stand throughout the republican era.
As with many rulers of Rome, Servius Tullius’ life was cut short by murder.  Tullius’ 
daughter, Tullia, had married an equally ambitious man named Lucius Tarquinius.  Upon 
learning that Servius Tullius intended to hand the power of Rome over to the Senate, Lucius fell 
upon Tullius and threw him down a flight of stairs. Afterward, Tullia, Tullius’ own daughter, ran 
him over with a chariot. Despite the boldness of these acts, the Senate acquiesced to the 
argument that this was a legitimate usurpation and not murder.  As a result, Lucius Tarquinius 
became the ruler of Rome.  
The Tarquin line of kings would end after the acts by Lucius’ son Sextus Tarquinius 
caused a revolution. After he raped the wife of a wealthy patrician, a group of patricians staged a 
revolt in order to gain liberty from the king and his family. In the wake of the revolt led by 
Junius Brutus in 509, the Tarquin royal family was exiled from Rome. The expulsion of the king 
marked the end of Roman monarchies and the beginning of the republican period.
The Senate created the position of consul to lead the governing of the state and Lucius 
Junius Brutus and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus became the first consuls. Brutus set out a new 
model of government, which was said to be the model designed by former king Servius Tullius.  
Brutus and Collatinus returned the Senate to its original number; it had been drastically reduced 
by Lucius Tarquinius. The two consuls also helped the plebeians by re-establishing many of the 
rights that Lucius Tarquinius had revoked. The plebeians were allowed to have their own judges 
and the right to appeal to their own respective tribes. In a show of dramatic devotion to the newly 
emerging republic, Brutus ordered the execution of two of his own sons when he learned that 
they were participating in a plot to restore Lucius Tarquinius to power. Brutus’ consulship ended 
when he died in battle resisting an army raised by the Tarquin royal family.  
Interestingly, it was not Brutus who was responsible for the ban on royalty in Rome. 
Rather it was a consul, named Publius Valerius, who pronounced that there would be no more 
kings ruling Rome. As an honor, the people called Valerius “Publicola,” meaning “people-
lover,” because of  his work in founding the republican government. The authors of The 
Federalist chose his name, “Publius.” as the pen name with which they would sign their 
contributions to the debate over ratification.
In Federalist No. 38, Madison notes how the foundations of Roman government were 
laid by individuals acting single-handedly. This method  is in contrast to the method that the 
United States adopted in drafting its Constitution. Madison argues it is safer in the planning of a 
new government to use a number of framers, as opposed to one man. One man, he argues, can be 
easily corrupted and infringe upon the liberties of the people. Thus, a group, like the gathering in 
Philadelphia in 1787, is the safest way to create a government and protect the liberties of the 
citizens.
B. Multiple Legislatures: The Comitia Centuriata and the Comitia Tributa
I flatter myself it has been clearly shewn in my last number, that the 
particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority 
with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports.  
.     .     .
It is well known, that in the Roman Republic the Legislative authority in the last 
resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies; not as branches of the 
same Legislature, but as distinct and independent Legislatures, in each of which 
an opposite interest prevailed; in one, the Patrician–in the other, the Plebeian. 
Many arguments have been made adduced to prove the unfitness of two such 
seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to annul or repeal the acts 
of the other. But a man would have been regarded as frantic who should have 
attempted at Rome, to disprove their existence. It will already be understood that I 
allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA, and COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which 
the people voted by Centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the 
Patrician interest: in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the Plebeian interest 
had an entire predominancy. And yet the two Legislatures coexisted for ages, and 
the Roman Republic attained to the pinnacle of human greatness. 
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such contradiction 
as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either side to annul the acts 
of the other. And in practice there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; 
because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce 
themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the interim, the United States 
will in all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to 
which the particular States would be inclined to resort.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 3430
In this paper, Alexander Hamilton argues in favor of permitting both the individual states 
and the federal government to impose taxes. In order to counter any criticism that there would be 
conflicts between these dual systems, Hamilton draws an analogy to the legislative assemblies of 
classical Rome and their overlapping jurisdictions.31 In the republican era, the Roman institutions 
of the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa had similar responsibilities and powers; 
however, their interests were biased towards different classes of society, and they followed 
different operating procedures.  
According to legend, after Servius Tullius assumed the throne in 578 B.C.E., he made 
many improvements to the Roman infrastructure, including establishing the comitia centuriata.  
Previously, there had been only the comitia curiata, which was based on a clan system, in which 
the Roman populous was divided into three tribes and then subdivided into ten groups (curiae)  
per tribe. Under the earlier system, members of the comitia curiae could vote on such matters as 
declaring war and appointing priests to various religious positions.
Underlying the creation of the comitia centuriata was a new system of political 
organization. The government took a census of every free person within Roman territory and 
recorded his or her wealth. The people were then organized into one of 5 classes, which were  
divided into a total of 193 centuries. The first class encompassed the wealthiest portions of 
Roman society, including 80 centuries of wealthy citizens and 18 centuries  of the knightly class,  
known as equestrians. The classes were arranged such that the wealthiest Romans fell into the 
first class and the members were progressively poorer from class one to class five. When it came 
time to vote on an issue, the voting started with the first class and then proceeded onto the 
second class and so forth until a majority was reached. However, because 98 of the 193 centuries 
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were in the first class, there was usually a majority as soon as the first class voted. Thus, the 
political power in Rome remained firmly in the hands of the patricians, who comprised the first 
voting class.
Although the comitia centuriata did lose some of its importance as time passed, the 
comitia nonetheless retained many of its duties throughout the republican era. The comitia 
centuriata remained responsible for selecting military leaders, censors, consuls, and other senior 
magistrates. However, because its size made it cumbersome, the comitia centuriata, it was rarely 
convened to make decisions on the day-to-day operations of the republic. Instead, the much 
smaller and therefore more practical Senate oversaw the general matters of the state.  
In stark contrast to the patrician-dominated comitia centuriata was the comitia tributa 
(tribal assembly).  This assembly was organized in 312 by Appius Claudius and was based on a 
tribal system similar to that of the comitia curiata. The assembly consisted of thirty-five tribes, 
with each Roman citizen assigned to one of the tribes.
When voting on an issue, the comitia tributa favored the masses of Roman plebeians 
while the comitia centuriata favored the patrician class. The strong plebeian control of the 
comitia tributa stemmed from the equality in the voting scheme of the assembly. Instead of 
reserving the majority of voting units for patricians, it provided a system for representing Roman 
society in proportion to Rome’s actual class composition. Thus, the small number of patricians 
was dwarfed by the significantly larger number of free Romans plebeians. A tribe’s vote was 
simply determined by counting the number of people from that tribe in attendance on the day of 
the vote. Because the plebeians could muster a much larger number of votes than the patricians, 
they held sway. However, the patricians exercised a check on this system. As with the comitia 
centuriata, the comitia tributa could vote on only those legislative proposals that the Senate had 
promulgated
The duties of the comitia tributa were of less significance than those of the comitia 
centuriata. It would elect minor magistrates such as tribunes, aediles and quaestors. However, by 
287, both the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa had the power to legislate.  Further, 
because of the relative ease of holding a vote in the comitia tributa, consuls would increasingly 
take their legislative proposals to that assembly in order to avoid convening the larger and more 
complex comitia centuriata. Therefore, it became increasingly more common for legislation, 
called plebiscites, to come from the comitia tributa.                     
In Federalist No. 34, Hamilton argues that governmental bodies with overlapping duties 
can exist contemporaneously. In classical Rome, there were two such legislative assemblies with 
overlapping duties.  The long life of the republic indicates that establishing redundant 
legislatures will not necessarily cripple the state. Hamilton extends this argument, to declare that 
the United States can have a dual system of taxation, with both individual States and the federal 
government possessing the power to levy taxes to suit their needs. However, Hamilton writes as 
an advocate and does not discuss differences between the Roman and proposed American 
systems, in particular, the domination of the Roman Senate over both assemblies and Rome’s 
unitary government as opposed to the dual federal-state governmental system in the United 
States. Such an analysis would require addressing many questions about whether these 
differences make the historical analogy apposite, a task perhaps not appropriate for a newspaper 
column.
C. The Senate as an Internal Governmental Check
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect, that history 
informs us of no longlived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome and 
Carthage are in fact the only states to whom that character can be applied. . . 
.These examples, though unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the 
genius of America, are notwithstanding, when compared to the fugitive and 
turbulent existence of other antient republics, very instructive proofs of the 
necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. . . . The people 
can never wilfully betray their own interests: but they may possibly be betrayed 
by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater 
where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men than 
where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every 
public act.
James Madison, Federalist No. 6332
In Federalist No. 63, James Madison stresses the importance of a senatorial body in the 
proposed national government and supports his position with examples from Carthage, Rome 
and Sparta. With these examples, Madison argues that an important part of a long-lived republic 
is a senate that serves in conjunction with the lower legislative body and the executive in a 
system of checks and balances.33
The foundations of the Roman senate date back to the time of Romulus, the founder of        
ancient Rome.  In 753 B.C.E., Romulus, established a council of elders that became known as 
the senate.  This body of one hundred men served as his advisory council. Romulus elevated the 
members of the senate to the status of patres (fathers of Roman society). As a result, their 
descendants would inherit the privileged noble status of patricii (patricians).  
With the fall of the Roman monarchy in 509, the senate took on new duties. Now 
composed of 300 men, the senate served as an advisory board and convened when summoned by 
one of the two consuls or a praetor, the magistrate responsible for the administration of justice 
and sometimes the governor of a Roman province. In addition to its advisory role, the senate 
exercised control over public finances and oversaw public works projects. It also had a major 
voice in foreign policy and oversaw the administration of the ever-growing number of Roman 
provinces.  
The significance of the Roman senate to the Framers of the American Constitution related not 
just to its duties, but also to its function in the Roman system of checks and balances. The 
Roman senate could veto any legislation put forth by the various popular assemblies. In theory, 
the consuls had the ability to disregard suggested courses of action given by the senate; however, 
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a consul rarely ignored the advice of the senate.  Further, magistrates, known as Tribunes of the 
Plebs, could veto proposals made by any level, including those made by a consul, the senate or 
the popular assemblies .
It was this system of checks and balances that Montesquieu used as the basis for his The 
Spirit of the Laws, which, in turn, inspired the American Framers to create a system of checks 
and balances.34
As the Republic grew older the criteria for membership in the senate evolved. In the early 
Republic, only the male patrician descendants of the original senators qualified for the senate.  
Those chosen from these noble clans served for life, subject to dismissal only for grave public or 
private wrongdoings. The commoners, known as plebeians, were denied access to all positions of 
importance in the republic with the exception of the position of the Tribune of the Plebs.  
However, in 367, after years of political unrest caused by the under represented plebeians, the 
senate accepted a plebiscite proposed by two tribunes, Gaius Licinius and Lucius Sextius, that  
called for one of the two consulship positions to be held by a plebeian.  With the plebeian’s 
ability to hold the highest office in Rome also came the ability to serve in the senate.  Thus, the 
traditional aristocratic hold on the government was broken.  
    In Federalist Paper No. 63, Madison argues for a senate as a way to respond to threats 
to liberty which loom over a republic with only one legislative body. In partial support of his 
argument, Madison points to the ancient societies that possessed a senatorial body as proof that a 
senate can have a stabilizing effect on a society. Madison notes that the United states cannot 
mimic the exact functioning of these bodies. Despite noting that the exact functioning of these 
ancient senates should not be mimicked in America, Madison does indicate that liberty in these 
ancient societies was secure because of a senate’s stabilizing effect on a republic.
Perhaps ironically, Madison did not serve in the first Senate because of the opposition of 
Patrick Henry, who had opposed the new constitution. Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson:
They made me a candidate for the senate, for which I had not allotted my 
pretensions. The attempt was defeated by Mr. Henry, who is omnipotent in the 
present legislature, and who added to the expedients common on such occasions, 
a public philippic against my federal principles.35
D. The House of Representatives as an Internal Check: The Tribunes
Lastly, in Sparta we meet the Ephori and in Rome with the Tribunes; two 
bodies, small indeed in number, but annually elected by the whole body of the 
people, and considered as the representatives of the people, almost in their 
plenipotentiary capacity.
.     .     .
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From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the 
principle of representation was neither unknown to the antients, nor wholly 
overlooked in their political constitutions.
.     .     .
The tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is 
well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained 
the most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity 
was required in every act of the tribunes, even after their number was augmented 
to ten. It proves the irresistable force possessed by that branch of a free 
government, which has the people on its side.
.     .     .
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, 
that the federal senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual 
usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in 
believing that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the 
foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of representatives with the 
people on their side will at all times be able to bring back the constitution to its 
primitive form and principles.
James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 6336
The only objection which remains to be canvassed is that which would 
substitute the proportion of two thirds of all members composing the senatorial 
body to that of two thirds of the members present. It has been shewn that of two 
thirds of the second head of our inquiries that all provisions which require more 
than the majority of any body to its resolutions have a direct tendency to 
embarrass the operations of the government and an indirect one to subject the 
sense of the majority to that of the minority. This consideration seems sufficient 
to determine our opinion, that the convention have gone as far in the endeavour to 
secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties as could have been 
reconciled either with the activity of the public councils or with a reasonable 
regard to the major sense of the community. If two thirds of the whole number of 
members had been required, it would in many cases from the non attendance of a 
part amount in practice to a necessity of unanimity. And the history of every 
political establishment in which this principle has prevailed is a history of 
impotence, perplexity and disorder. Proofs of this proposition might be adduced 
from the examples of the Roman tribuneship, the Polish diet, and the states-
general of the Netherlands; did not an example at home render foreign precedents 
unnecessary.
36
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Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 7537
In discussing the tribunes of Rome, Madison is arguing for the necessity of an American 
senate. As Madison points out, there were elected bodies ancient civilizations, for example, 
Rome’s tribunes of the plebeians, an elected position, beginning in the early Roman republic and 
lasting well into its later years.38 Madison views the tribuneship as another check against the 
potential tyranny of the Senate, a body that under the proposed Constitution was expected to be 
elected by state legislatures and not directly by the people.
In Federalist Paper No. 75, Alexander Hamilton also uses the tribunes in his argument.  
However, in contrast to Madison, Hamilton uses the tribunes to illustrate the ineffectiveness of a 
political body when unanimity is required among its member on order to pass legislation. In this 
paper, Hamilton was arguing for the proposition that the President should have the power to 
make treaties with the advice and consent of “two-thirds of the senators present,” as opposed to 
“two-thirds of all members of the senate.” According to Hamilton, requiring an approving vote 
of two-thirds of all senators would encourage dissenting senators to absent themselves to 
effectively veto the treaty. Their absences, Hamilton points out, would necessitate a unanimous 
vote by those present, and requiring a unanimous approval for government actions would result 
in considerable governmental inefficiency. To support his argument against unanimous votes, he 
refers to the Roman tribunes.
Classical Rome endured much with strife because of  the imbalance of power between the 
ruling class of patricians, and the under represented masses of plebeians. In 446 B.C.E., in 
response to the threat of civil unrest and possible civil war, the patricians approved the plebeians’ 
proposal for the appointment of four magistrates, called the Tribunes of the Plebeians. The 
number of tribunes would later expand to ten. This magistracy position gave the plebeians a 
voice in the government and helped bridge the gap between the rule of the patricians and the 
needs of the plebeians.  
The tribunes enjoyed considerable power and could veto any action taken by other 
magistrates, even consuls. Moreover, their bodies were considered sacrosanct. It was a crime 
punishable by death without trial for anyone to disregard the Tribune’s veto or to violate the 
sanctity of his body. A Tribune also could offer protective amnesty (auxilium) to anyone who 
requested the Tribune’s assistance. This power of protection ran so far as to prevent other 
magistrates from interfering with those who had been granted amnesty. However, although 
Hamilton suggests that tribunes had to act with unanimity, the historical record does not support 
this contention.
The tribunes were connected to the four tribes of the assembly of tribes, the comitia 
tributa, which represented each of four geographic regions within the city of Rome. The four 
tribunes were elected annually, with each serving as the head of one of the four tribes. They were 
originally drawn from only the plebeian class; however, at the end of the Roman Republic, 
Emperor Augustus proclaimed that the Emperor would hold the new position of tribune for life.
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Although Madison fails to make mention of the fact, the elected tribunes were not 
without corruption. Starting in 377, two Tribunes and champions of the plebeians, C. Licinius 
and L. Sextius, were reelected to office ten times and began to cause great political turmoil by 
boycotting important magistracy elections for other positions. Through the use of their veto 
power, they virtually stopped the patrician consuls from exercising any power.
 Whenever grave danger faced the city, the senate could  appoint a dictator who would 
wield ultimate power. When a dictator held power, a tribune was powerless and lacked a veto 
power.. charged with the duty of putting an end to a grave danger facing Rome.  The Tribune 
power of veto did not extend to a dictator’s actions.  In general, dictators were utilized by the 
Romans quite frequently during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., but were less frequently 
used later on, except during the Punic Wars against Carthage starting in the mid third century.
In Federalist No. 63, Madison contends that the United States needs a senatorial body, 
but argues that a senate will not become excessively powerful. Just as the Roman tribunes could 
check the power of aristocratic government, the proposed House of Representatives could check 
the Senate: “[N]othing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the senate, but 
such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that 
branch of the legislature, the affections and support of the entire body of the people 
themselves.”39
VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE STANDING ARMY
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil 
society.  It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers 
requisite for obtaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
.     .     .
The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in time of 
peace. They were introduced by Charles VII of France. All Europe has followed, 
or been forced into the example. Had the example not been followed by other 
nations, all Europe must long ago have worne the chains of a universal monarch. 
Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishment, the 
same event might follow.  The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for 
the undisciplined valour of all other nations, and rendered her mistress of the 
world.  
Not the less true is it,that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to 
her military triumphs, and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, 
have with few exceptions been the price of her military establishments. A 
standing force therefore is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a 
necessary provision.
.     .     .
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America, united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a 
more forbidding posture to foreign ambition, than America disunited, with a 
hundred thousand veterans ready for combat.
.     .     .
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of 
the opposition to the Federal Government is an unvaried exemplification. But 
among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than 
the attempt to enlist on that side, the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, 
of standing armies.  The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that 
important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a 
thorough and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution has provided the 
most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a 
Constitution fully adequate to the national defence, and the preservation of the 
Union can save America from as many standing armies at it may be split into 
States or Confederacies; as from such a progressive augmentation of these 
establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and 
ominous to the liberties of the people; as any establishment that can become 
necessary, under a united and efficient Government, must be tolerable to the 
former, and safe to the latter.
James Madison, Federalist No. 4140
In this paper, Madison argues that creating a standing army in America is a necessary 
evil. As he notes, Rome was able to conquer her neighbors who did not maintain adequate 
military defenses. However, Madison also notes  that the same standing army that brought Rome 
victories abroad also interfered with domestic politics and sometimes controlled it.41
 In the United States, Madison argues, standing armies are necessary to deter foreign 
attack; however, if each state raised its own standing army, this multitude of military forces 
could easily infringe upon the liberties of the citizens. (At the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, the State militias were not standing armies.) To prevent this threat to liberty, 
Madison argues that a single standing army serving a united America would  provide adequate 
defense to the nation as well as minimize the domestic threats to liberty that commonly 
accompany standing armies.
During the republican era, Roman armies conquered the majority of the rim of the 
Mediterranean, including  Carthage, Greece, Gaul, Numidia, Africa, Macedonia, Spain, Asia, 
Cyrenaica, and Egypt. The legions usually were levied for the campaign season, spanning March 
to October, and then were disbanded for harvest season. By 60 B.C.E. there were about fourteen 
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standing garrisons of troops, with service requirements of six to sixteen years.
 Between 29 B.C.E. and 14 C.E. with the rise of Caesar Augustus, the Roman army faced 
fundamental changes that would remain throughout the age of the Roman empire.  There were to 
be 28 legions, comprised of approximately 6000 men each (including noncombatants) and 120 
cavalry soldiers. These legionaries were to serve for at least twenty years. By creating such a 
long and continuous service requirement, Augustus was able to create a standing army of 
professional soldiers.  These legions were permanently stationed in locations across the Roman 
Empire and one legion, known as the praetorian cohort, was charged with the duty of protecting 
the emperor and was stationed primarily in the nearby cities of Latium.  
 Although much Roman military activity during the Empire involved quelling rebellions 
in Roman provinces, the standing army also played a role in expanding the empire. Examples 
include Emperor Claudius’ invasion of Britain and the Dacian wars.    
The invasion of Britain illustrates how Rome could dominate a country with inferior 
defenses. In 43, the Emperor Claudius ordered the invasion in response to the threat created by 
Belgian tribes of Britain who were raiding the coast of Gaul. Britain’s wealth of natural 
resources may also have played a role. Claudius’ lieutenant Aulus Paulus led an army of four 
legions across the English Channel and landed on the coast of Kent.  Paulus then quickly forced 
his way up the Thames, easily defeating the unorganized fighting forces of the local tribes along 
the way.  He also easily subdued the Trinobantes, the local tribe inhabiting the Essex area, and 
conquered Britain in only 16 days. The Roman legions continued their sweep across the island 
and defeated the tribal prince Caractacus on the battlefield in present-day Wales. With the 
pacification of Britain drawing to a close, the Romans erected the temple of Rome and Augustus 
at Camulodunum and proclaimed Britain an official province of the Roman Empire.    
Another example of the Roman empire using its superior military force was the Dacian 
Wars on the Danube in present-day Hungary. In 10, Emperor Trajan ordered an invasion of 
Dacia in  response to the threat of a possible an anti-Roman alliance led by King Decebalus.  
Trajan and his legions repeatedly defeated their barbarian adversaries on the battlefield and 
chased any retreating men into Dacian territory. In 102 C.E., Trajan conquered the heart of Dacia 
and took the Dacian capital of Sarmizegethusa, compelling Decebalus to sue for peace.  This 
speedy conquest demonstrates the efficiency of the Roman legion in covering large distances and 
quickly pacifying unorganized tribes.
In 105, Decebalus and his followers resumed their hostilities against Rome by attacking 
the Iazyges, who were allied to Rome, and destroying the Roman outposts in Dacia.  Once again, 
Trajan quickly re-conquered the region and re-took the Dacian capital. After fleeing to his 
mountain fortress, Decebalus took his own life. With this event, the pacification of Dacia was 
complete, and Rome made the region north of the Danube into a Roman province and sent in 
settlers from different parts of the empire.
Madison neglects to point out, Rome’s imperial legions did not completely dominate the 
neighbors of Rome. In fact, legions sometimes faced annihilation by soldiers that were less 
organized and had inferior training. An example is, the “Varus disaster” of 9 C.E.
 During the reign of Augustus, the Rhine region was not yet a securely held Roman 
province, but hosted only a precariously placed Roman government ruling over the Germanic 
inhabitants. The Roman proconsul was Quintilius Varus, whose system of governing by Roman 
law did not receive a warm welcome from the Germans. The Germans followed  a demagogue 
named Arminius and  rose against the Roman establishment, forcing Varus to mobilize three 
legions in an effort to engage the rebels on the battlefield. As Varus led his legions through the 
passes of the Teutoburger Forest, the Germans ambushed the legions. In the fighting that 
followed, three legions were annihilated, three eagles standards representing the pride of the 
three Roman legions were carried off, Varius committed suicide, and Germany was lost. Thus, in 
one day, Rome lost three of its twenty-eight legions to a force that was supposed to be inferior in 
every way.
Whatever advantage Rome gained by having standing armies came at the cost of 
increased military domination over the domestic affairs of the state. From roughly 27 B.C.E. to 
200 C.E., the praetorian cohort in Rome played a major role in Roman politics. The 
demonstrations of praetorian influence started modestly, when after the death of Emperor 
Tiberius, Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro, a praetorian prefect, recommended to the Senate that 
it accept the young Caius (Caligula) as the next emperor. However, soon afterward the praetorian 
prefects, backed by their soldiers stationed on the outskirts of Rome, became increasingly bolder 
in their political interference.  In 41, Caligula’s reign was cut short by Cassius Chaerea, a 
praetorian, and a group of conspirators, all of whom Caligula had insulted.  
Immediately following the assassination of Caligula, the praetorian cohort would once 
again exercise its political influence by selecting the next emperor. On the very same day as the 
assassination, some praetorian soldiers were wandering through the Imperial palace when they 
discovered Caligula’s uncle Claudius cowering behind some curtains. The guardsmen hoisted 
Claudius up and carried him off to their encampment, where they decided that Claudius could 
serve as a tool of the Praetorian Guard. To insure Claudius’s elevation, the soldiers brought him 
before the Senate and insisted that it accept him as emperor. Once again, the Senate acquiesced 
to the praetorian’s demands.
The praetorians were not the only standing legion to interfere in Roman political matters.  
On occasion, the frontier legions would also rise up in an effort to install their choice of 
emperors. After the death of Emperor Nero in 68., the legions in Spain proclaimed their leader, 
Galba, the new emperor and began the march to Rome. On his march into Rome, Galba used his 
military support to make examples out of those who also desired power over the empire. As he 
arrived in Rome, a mutiny sprung up among soldiers in upper Germania, who were unhappy with 
Galba’s succession to the throne. At the same time, Otho, another aspirant the throne, began to 
turn Galba’s own soldiers against him. These soldiers had grown discontented with the idea of 
marching to Germania in order to quell the opposition to Galba. Shortly thereafter, Galba was 
killed by a group of soldiers who had sided with Otho, and Otho became emperor.
However, the legions in Gaul supported Vitellius, their general, as an aspirant to the 
throne. Toward this end, Vitellius began to march his legions toward Rome, and Otho mobilized 
his troops to intercept those of Vitellius. This civil war progressed until Vitellius met with 
victory at the battle of Bedriacum. Following the battle, Vitellius and his troops marched across 
the countryside, looting the villas and villages that they met along the way.  
While this civil war was raging, the legions of the East, who held nearly one-half of all 
Roman military strength, had remained voiceless in the struggle. Then in July, 69, Mucianus, the 
proconsul of Syria, began a march west, supported by his first in command, Flavius Vespasianus, 
whom the soldiers had chosen to be the next emperor. In December, 69, Vespasian’s armies 
arrived at Rome and broke through the walls. They followed Vitellius’ retreating troops into the 
recesses of Rome, all the while looting the city as they passed through. Finally, they captured 
Vitellius was captured at the imperial palace and put him to death. Supported by his legions, 
Vespasian, was named the new emperor by the Senate, and the civil war officially came to a 
close.  
The assassination of Emperor Pertinax offers a final example of the dangers that standing 
armies pose. In March, 193,the praetorian guard realized that Pertinax would not be its puppet 
and arranged for his assassination. Following the assassination, the praetorian prefects 
recognized that there were multiple parties who wished to assume the throne and decided to 
auction off the position to the highest bidder.  A senator, Marcus Didius Julianus, purchased the 
throne by paying 25,000 sesterces to each praetorian prefect. Because the senate feared reprisals 
from the Praetorian Guard, it powerless to object to the transaction.  
Yet, once again the frontier legions rose up against the new emperor, and, under the 
command of Publius Septimius Severus, they marched on Rome. In this instance, however, the 
march on Rome was much less destructive than that resulting from the civil war of 69. After a 
soldier murdered Julianus, Severus simply assumed power.
In Federalist No. 41, Madison argues that although standing armies are necessary, they 
can destroy to the liberties of the very nation that they are designed to protect. As illustrated by 
the campaigns waged by Claudius and Trajan, standing armies enabled Rome to dominate its 
militarily inferior neighbors. However, this success came at a cost, as the very same legions that 
brought victory to Rome also served to create political upheaval at home, as well as requiring 
considerable revenues to maintain.
In order to enjoy security and yet minimize the problems inherent in having standing 
armies, Madison argues in favor of a national standing army. He also recognizes that a national 
standing arm acts as a check on the armies of the individual states.
VII. CONCLUSION
This selective survey of Roman history and its meaning for the authors of The Federalist
must leave the modern reader with a number of questions. This Article concludes by briefly 
discussing three of them: Did the first readers of The Federalist understand these classical 
references? Why did Publius choose to make references to a Roman era that was hardly the  
model of good government? And, with the change in our intellectual canon, what political 
analogies does a modern commentator use in place of the classical ones?
The modern reader has to be impressed with the familiarity of late eighteenth century 
readers with classical civilization. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were well educated and well 
read;42 however, not all members of their audience had the same background. The three authors 
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were experienced in the fields of politics and law and therefore knew that they had to 
communicate with a particular audience, whatever its level of sophistication. Yet, these authors 
could correctly assume that their historical references would not be lost on their readers. As one 
authority has stated, the late eighteenth century was “truly a classical age.”43 As Forrest 
McDonald has pointed out, citizens could learn about classical civilization from a multiplicity of 
secondary sources, including “plays, newspapers, orations, and charges to grand juries.”44 How 
much depth there was to the historical knowledge of the citizenry is an open question.45
However, great depth is not necessary to understand Publius’ references.
To use a modern example, today’s somewhat educated citizens would know that the 
United States Constitution was drafted at the Constitutional Convention and that the dispute 
On the familiarity of the deputies to the Constitutional Convention with classical history 
and their facility with Latin and Greek, see supra note 6; Richard M. Gummere, The American 
Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition 174 (Harv. U. Press 1969).
43
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44
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During the late colonial and early national periods theatrical productions of Addison’s 
Cato, Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Nathaniel Lee’s Alexander the Great, Thomas 
Otway’s Venice Preserved, and Henry Brooke’s Gustavus Vasa, the Deliverer of  his 
Country, among many others, familiarized American audiences with classical lore and 
republican ideals. . . . Meanwhile, since the 1720s American printers had been reprinting . 
. . essays, articles, plays, and poems from the Tattler, the Guardian, the Craftsman, the 
Spectator, and other British publications In this way, thousands of Americans who 
perhaps never read any book except the Bible could share the classical revival that had 
begun to flourish in Britain during the seventeenth century and continued to do so during 
the eighteenth, and could thereby absorb republican sentiments and values without being 
aware of where they came from. The message was cast wider in public orations, which 
were among the limited number of forms of popular entertainment. . . . Grand-jury 
charges, such as those delivered by John Jay, were likewise popular forums for the 
spreading of republican values.
Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
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between the large and small states led to the Great Compromise.46 They would know that under 
the Compromise, the House of Representatives would consist of delegates elected by popular 
vote and that the Senate would consist of two delegates from each state.47 For these modern 
citizens, this knowledge of the Great Compromise is sufficient to understand the structure of the 
national government and the value of compromise. However, most citizens likely do not know 
that the vote accepting the compromise was 5-4-1.48 The vote became permanent only when the 
large states decided not to support the call for a reconsideration of the vote and thus accept the 
vote for the compromise.49 This decision by the large states was the true compromise. To 
understand the significance of the Great Compromise and to employ it as a way to understand the 
distribution of power among states of all sizes, a citizen need not be familiar with the details. A 
certain quantum of knowledge is enough. In the same way, American citizens of the late 
eighteenth century could appreciate Rome’s lessons without the need to become academics.
A second question of the modern reader might be what did Publius focus almost 
exclusively on classical Rome’s republican era? In view of today’s popular entertainment and the 
interest of a heavily Christian society on the time of Jesus, today’s citizenry focus is more on the 
Roman empire than on the previous centuries.  The answer has to lie with the word “republic.” 
From Publius’ viewpoint, he was advocating a republican government and, therefore, would 
naturally look to an earlier republic for lessons in politic science. Of course, the word “republic” 
has been used to describe many types of governments. In Federalist No. 10, Madison defines a 
republic as “a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place . . . .”50 In 
distinguishing a republic from a democracy, he writes:
 The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic 
are, first, the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of 
citizens elected by the rest: secondly, the greater number of citizens, and a greater 
sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.51
From this definition, it would appear that a republic is a representative government with a 
fairly significant population and geographical size. Although the Roman republic had a 
significant population and size, its character as a representative government might be open to 
46
. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at 167-70 (recounting these events).
47
. See U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
48
. See Madison, supra note 6, at 297
49
. See id. at 301-02.
50
. The Federalist, supra note 2 (No. 10) at 62.
51
. Id. On the nature of republican government and society, in the eyes of the Framers, see 
David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist 118-23 (U. Chi. Press 1984); McDonald, 
supra note 6, at 66-77.
question. Although there were popular assemblies and tribunes representing the people, there 
was also a dominating patrician senate and continuing conflict between the rich and poor that 
might fit the definition of a class struggle.
At the same time, it would have been difficult for Publius not to use examples from a 
well known civilization that had at least some elements of representation, some roughly 
comparable governmental structures, and the distinction of lasting over 500 centuries.52 In 
addition, Publius employs republican Rome to offer both positive and negative lessons. 
Ultimately, the republic had failed. The Framer’s goal was to avoid a similar failure.
As a final question, the modern reader might look to the present age in which classical 
analogies have become remote and ask what a contemporary commentator might use in their 
place. If not a classical analogy, then what?
In truth, our political discourse has become insular. Our analogies are to our own history. 
We may make reference to our Founding, to the Civil War, to Reconstruction, to the Industrial 
Revolution, to the challenge of immigration, to the New Deal, and to our wars with other nations. 
References to the experiences of other countries have become quite rare. Perhaps our history, 
now over 200 years more extensive than it was at the Founding and offers closer analogies than 
other countries can offer. Perhaps comparative law–including comparative analyses to the laws 
of past civilizations– has failed to realize its promise.
Yet, political history is about people, their character, their use of power, and their 
relationships as much as it is about political institutions and events. The lessons from this sort of 
history is profitable and transcends the limits of time and culture. Perhaps we still can profit from 
learning about the decemvirs, the tribunes, and Rome’s army. The study of history remains a 
worthy endeavor.
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